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stance of the agreement and should more accurately reflect the true nature
of the voting "trust"-a corporate control device.
TURNER VANN ADAMS
Criminal Law-Involuntary Manslaughter Arising Out of
Business Transactions
In Commonwealth v. Feinberg1 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed the conviction of a merchant on five counts of involuntary man-
slaughter arising out of the sale to and consumption by certain indi-
viduals of Sterno, a jelly-like substance intended for heating purposes.
Sitting without a jury, the trial court determined that the defendant knew
or should have known first, that some of his purchasers intended to con-
sume rather than to burn the substance and second, that consumption
of it could be lethal.' Evidence on the former issue was that in selling
Sterno the defendant recognized an order to "make one" as a request for
a can of Sterno to drink, often referred to Sterno as shoe polish, and fre-
quently requested customers to hide their purchased Sterno as they left
the premises.3 Directed toward the latter issue was evidence that each can
of the lethal Sterno was marked on the lid as follows: "Institutional
Sterno. Danger. Poison. Not for home use. For commercial and in-
dustrial use only."4 The chemical contents of the industrial Sterno were
not stated on the container, and the defendant was not otherwise informed
of those contents. The non-lethal Sterno that the defendant had ap-
parently been selling for some time was marked "Caution. Flammable.
For use only as a fuel."' Both containers were identical except that the
industrial Sterno did not have a paper wrap-around label.
The supreme court applied contrasting legal tests to each of these two
problems. It repeatedly stated that the defendant "knew or should have
known" that the Sterno would be lethal if consumed.' Evidence in the
nature of objective facts, such as the contrasting markings on the con-
tainers of lethal and non-lethal Sterno, supported this conclusion. Apply-
ing an objective standard, the court found that since a reasonable man
would have been aware of the poisonous nature of the Sterno, the defen-
'433 Pa. 558, 253 A.2d 636 (1969).
'Id. at - , 253 A.2d at 641.
'Commomvealth v. Feinberg, 211 Pa. Super. 100, 103 n.3, 234 A.2d 913, 914
n.3 (1967).
'Id. at 103, 234 A.2d at 914.5Id.
8433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 641, 643, 644.
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dant would be charged with that knowledge." On the other hand, the
court stated several times in Feinberg that the defendant did in fact know
that his patrons intended to consume the substance.8 Evidence support-
ing that conclusion was in the nature of subjective proof of the defen-
dant's actual knowledge such as his own actions and words. By applying
both the subjective and objective tests the court did not limit itself strictly
to either one.
Involuntary manslaughter is commonly said to be the killing of an-
other through the commission of reckless and wanton acts. Its essence is
"intentional conduct, by way either of commission or omission, where
there is a duty to act, which involves a high degree of likelihood that
substantial harm will result to another."9 In Feinberg the conduct in
question, selling Sterno, was an intentional act. There was a high degree
of likelihood that harm would result due to the lethal nature of the Sterno
and the probability that the "skid-row" alcoholics would drink it. There-
fore, whether the defendant was under a duty is the major issue in the
case.
A duty to act arises from the obligation to conform to a standard of
care.'0 Three different standards of care were proposed at various
stages in the history of this case. A merchant might be required to as-
certain how a purchaser intended to use an item purchased." If the use
were dangerous, selling the item would subject the merchant to criminal
" So far as perception is concerned, it seems clear that the actor must give
to his surroundings the attention which a standard reasonable man would
consider necessary under the circumstances, and that he must use such sense
as he has to discover what is readily apparent. He may be negligent in
failing to look, or in failing to observe what is visible when he does look.
W. PROssER, LAW or TORTS § 32, at 160 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
PRossER].
8 433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d 641-42. Once, however, the court unexplainably
stated that the defendant sold the substance "knowing or having reason to know"
that his patrons intended to consume rather than to burn it. Id. at - , 253 A.2d
at 642. In addition, the court quoted from the Pennsylvania intermediate appellate
court, which concluded that the defendant "might reasonably have expected" pur-
chasers to drink the substance. Id. at -, 253 A.2d at 642; quoting 211 Pa. Super.
at 110, 234 A.2d 917 (1967). This 1967 opinion is cited in 40 Am. JUR. 2d
Homicide § 86 (1968) to support the following proposition:
Thus, it has been held that a merchant in a "skid-row" district who sold a
solidified alcohol, popularly called "canned heat" which had additives speci-
fied by the United States government to render it unfit for drinking purposes,
to purchasers whom he knew or should have known intended to use the sub-
stance for drinking purposes, could be held guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter where the purchasers died as a result of drinking the substance.
o Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (1944).1
oPROSSER § 53, at 331.
11433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 642.
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liability for the harmful consequences. Broader even than strict liability
in tort,"2 this comprehensive standard of care was rejected summarily
by the supreme court.'3 The intermediate appellate court expressed the
standard that it adopted as follows:
In light of the recognized weaknesses of the purchasers of the product,
and [defendant's] greater concern for profit than with the results of
his actions, he was grossly negligent and demonstrated a wanton and
reckless disregard for the welfare of those whom he might reasonably
have expected to use the product for drinking purposes.14
That court applied to defendant's behavior an objective standard based
on the actions of a reasonable man. The third possible standard of care
is the apparent holding of the supreme court: A merchant is bound by a
legal duty not to sell an item only if he is aware of dangerous abnormal
use "contemplated" by a purchaser.'" Although the court appeared to
choose the subjective standard (what the defendant actually knew) in-
stead of the objective standard (what he should have known), it still left
doubt by stating once in the opinion that the defendant "knew or should
have known" the intentions of his customers.'
Feinberg is novel because of the court's application of a duty to a
merchant who sells an item that may be lethal if used in an abnormal way.
The court explained that it was controlled by the "black letter law"'7 of
Thiede v. State,'" an old Nebraska case holding that a person who unin-
tentionally gave poisonous liquor to another was guilty of involuntary
manslaughter. It is important to note, however, that Thiede is distin-
guishable from Feinberg by the same facts making the latter a significant
case. Thiede involved criminal liability for the defendant who simply
offered moonshine liquor to a friend; Feinberg involved a sale by a mer-
chant. The duty of the former was to provide a nonlethal drink. The
same duty would require the latter to insure that any item out of hun-
dreds or even thousands sold would be safe for normal use. Although
" PRoSSER § 96, at 667-68. The seller is not liable in tort if a purchaser uses
an item in an unforeseen way: McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272 F.2d
700 (10th Cir. 1959) (using window casements as a ladder); Schfranek v. Ben-jamin Moore & Co., 54 F.2d 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (stirring a wall decorating com-
pound with a finger); Lawson v. Benjamin Ansehl Co., 180 S.W.2d 751 (Spring-
field, Mo., Ct. App. 1944) (intentionally setting a finger nail polish on fire).
"433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 642.
" 211 Pa. Super. at 110, 234 A.2d at 917 (emphasis added).
433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 642.
See note 8 supra.
' 433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 641.
'8 106 Neb. 48, 182 N.W. 570 (1921).
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courts have recognized such a duty to some extent in the law of torts,' 9
they have not previously carried it over into criminal law. Thiede is also
distinguishable because in Feinberg an abnormal use was the cause of
death. This fact compounds the stringent result reached by applying the
duty of Thiede to the facts of Feinberg. Under such an application, a
merchant must refrain from selling not only inherently dangerous articles
but also those that may be dangerous if used in an abnormal way if he
knows (or, possibly, has reason to know) of the intended dangerous use.
Tort liability for negligence has been applied to a vendor who fails to
exercise reasonable care in the sale.2" A defendant owner of a hardware
store has been held liable in tort for having sold ammunition to a four-
teen-year-old who accidentally shot a neighbor.21 A bartender has been
found liable for tort damages that resulted from a fight instigated by a
customer who had consumed too much of the defendant's liquor.22 Crim-
inal liability under these circumstances was not imposed on the defen-
dants.23 However, under the standard of Feinberg a criminal indictment
arguably could have been sought.
If, as in Feinberg, a court expands criminal liability into areas pre-
viously covered only by tort law, then that court should deal with policies
that may distinguish criminal law. It has been asserted that making
criminal negligence coincide with tort negligence would be too harsh ;24
criminal liability should be reserved for cases of moral fault since the im-
pending sanctions can have no effect on the inadvertent actor.2 5 Further-
"0 PROSSER § 97, at 677-78. Following Spencer v. Three Rivers Builders &
Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) (applying liability
without fault to a seller when a house collapsed), courts have applied liability
without fault to the sale of automobiles, tires, airplanes, an electric cable, grinding
wheels, a combination power tool, playground equipment, herbicides, insecticides, a
chair, a riveting machine, and a water heater.
20 PROSSER § 95, at 648-49.
Mautino v. Piercedale Supply Co., 338 Pa. 435, 13 A.2d 51 (1940).
Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
. Each of the cases was a civil proceeding for damages. Although none spe-
cifically held that a criminal action would not be upheld, no action was in fact
brought. In Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961), the court
stated that if the tort rule for causation were applied to criminal proceedings, then in
each of the cases the defendant would have been guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Id. at 577, 170 A.2d at 312-13. Implicit in that statement is the court's assump-
tion that no criminal action could be brought.
21 R. MOREEAD, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 112 (1952). Cf. Commonwealth v.
Root, 403 Pa. 571, 577, 170 A.2d 310, 312-13 (1961); Davis, The Development
Negligence as a Basis for Criminal Liability in Criminal Homicide Cases, 26 Ky.
LJ. 209, 223 (1938).
-G G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 99 (1961). Cf. Hart, The Aims of Criminal
Law, 23 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 401, 416-17 (1958). But see MODEL PE NAL
CODE 2.02, Comment at 126-27 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) :
1970]
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more, juries are reluctant to convict persons of criminal negligence.20
On the other hand, the high degree of culpability in this particular case
militated in favor of imposing on the defendant a duty analogous to that
in tort law. Perhaps for this reason the court, without alluding to any
of these distinguishing policies, recognized a duty for a merchant to act
in a situation in which he possessed knowledge that the item purchased
would be used in an abnormal manner.
A conviction for involuntary manslaughter requires not only that the
defendant be negligent in doing some lawful act but that his negligence
cause the harmful result.2 7 Causation has been characterized as the "de-
gree of participation that is necessary to warrant a conviction." 28 In Fein-
berg, analysis of causation is complicated by the fact that the deceased's
own acts contributed to his death.
Actual causation 29 (causa sine qua non)80 is established in Feinberg
by convincing evidence. An expert toxicologist testified that death could
have resulted from consumption of the new industrial Sterno but not
from the ordinary Sterno that the defendant previously sold.81 The de-
Knowledge that conviction and sentence, not to speak of punishment, may
follow conduct that inadvertently creates improper risk supplies men with an
additional motive to take care before acting, to use their faculties and draw
on their experience in gauging the potentialities of contemplated conduct.
Id.
28 The following statistics indicate clearly that more than twice as many persons
accused of criminal negligence are acquitted, or have the charges dismissed, as
those accused of all crimes.
1966 1967
Criminal All Criminal, All
Negligemce Crimes Negligence Crimes
Years
Total persons charged 865 2,170,850 857 2,310,722
Percentages:
Guilty as charged 35.2% 64.9% 36.5% 63.5%
Guilty of lesser offense 10.6% 2.6% 11.7% 2.4%
Acquitted or dismissed 45.4% 15.9% 44.3% 16.2%
Referred to juvenile court 8.8% 16.6% 7.5% 17.9%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
1967 FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 109; 1966 FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 104.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4, Comment at 53-54 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
27 Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 574, 170 A.2d 310, 311 (1961).28 Note, Crimninal Liability of Participants in Fatal Russian Roulette, 21 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 121 (1964).2 R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 687 & n.11 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as PERKiNs].
" "[W]ithout which the result would not have occurred." State v. Des
Champs, 126 S.C. 416, 420, 120 S.E. 491, 493 (1923).
" 433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 642.
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fendant's cigar store was the only retail outlet in Philadelphia that dis-
pensed the lethal liquid. 2 If the defendant had not sold the dangerous
Sterno; no harmful results would have occurred.
In Commonwealth v. Atencio33 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
took an approach to causation which, although different from Feinberg,
might be pertinent. Relying on implicit conspiracy, the court found that
the "Commonwealth had an interest that the deceased should not be killed
by the wanton or reckless conduct of himself and others .... Such con-
duct could be found in the concerted action and cooperation of the defen-
dants in helping to bring about the deceased's foolish act."3
Although in Atencio the defendant was guilty as principal in the
second degree35 and, if the same reasoning is applied, in Feinberg as an
accessory before the fact,36 in each case guilt would be coincident with
that of the perpetrator.3" Since the perpetrators in each case were the
victims, imputing their guilt to the defendants is questionable due to the
difficulty of ascribing an unlawful act to the deceased persons. If a de-
ceased's act is suicide, it would be a felony only in a few jurisdictions.38
If his act is criminal negligence that resulted in his own death, it would
not be a crime. Atencio suggested a third possible crime, conspiracy to
create a risk.3" Conspiracy is, however, a tenuous argument in Feinberg
since the evidence presented at least implied that the deceased was not
the victim of suicide, and otherwise no recognized crime could be imputed
to the defendant.
Even though the defendant's act may have been a cause in fact of the
harmful consequence, it may not have been a "legal cause."4 Legal
" 211 Pa. Super. at 104, 234 A.2d at 915.
"' 345 Mass. 627, 189 N.E.2d 223 (1963).
" Id. at 629, 189 N.E.2d at 224-25.
" 9 VILL. L. Ruv. 134, 136-37 (1963). A principal in the second degree is one
who is guilty by reason of having aided, counseled or encouraged the commission
of a crime in his presence. PERKINS 658.
" An accessory before the fact is one who is guilty by reason of having aided
or encouraged commission of the crime without having been present at the
moment of perpetration. PmuxiNs 663. The defendant in Feinberg could be con-
sidered an accessory before the fact since he had aided the deceased by selling him
poisonous Sterno but was not present when he drank it.
"' PERKINS 684.
"E.g., Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Wynn, 29 Ala. App. 207, - , 194
So. 421, 423 (1940).
" "[Wanton and reckless conduct] could be found in the concerted action and
cooperation of the defendants in helping to bring about the deceased's foolish act."
345 Mass. at 629, 189 N.E.2d at 225.
" PERKINS 690-91. Among other terms used to convey the same meaning are
primary cause, efficient cause, efficient proximate cause, efficient adequate cause and
proximate cause.
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cause and its synonyms denote "what the courts will regard as the cause."41
When, as in Feinberg, legal cause is complicated by the intervening act
of the deceased, courts have had serious difficulty.
In Thiede4 the Nebraska court held that the deceased's voluntary act
of drinking poisonous liquor did not insulate the defendant from criminal
liability because that act was what the defendant had "contemplated.""
If the defendant intended44 for his friend to drink the liquor, then he should
have been responsible for any consequences. Although the standard of
care applied in Feinberg is distinguishable from that in Thiede, the chain
of causation in the two cases is similar. In fact, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Feinberg followed45 the causation argument made in
Thiede.
But that court in Commonwealth v. Root40 reversed a conviction for
involuntary manslaughter on the theory of a superseding intervening act.
The defendant in that case was engaged in an automobile race with an-
other person who, in attempting to pass the defendant, crashed head-on
into an oncoming vehicle and was killed. The court considered the de-
fendant's criminal liability to be cut off by the independent intervening
act of his competitor:
Where a second actor has become aware of the existence of a potential
danger created by the negligence of an original tort-feasor, and there-
after, by an independent act of negligence, brings about an accident,
the first tort-feasor is relieved of liability, because the condition created
by him was merely a circumstance of the accident and not its proxi-
mate cause.47
In Feinberg the independent intervening act in question was the de-
ceased's drinking the Sterno. The court held on the basis of the objec-
tive evidence offered that the defendant should have known about the
lethal nature of the substance.48 The deceased, therefore, might be equally
charged with knowledge of the danger since the only warning was on the
"x Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. Rav. 103, 104 (1911)
(emphasis added).
42 See p. 346 vtpra.
106 Neb. at 59, 182 N.W. at 574. "Contemplate signifies a purpose in respect
to the future." Reed v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 171 Pa. Super. 60, 64, 90 A.2d
371, 373 (1952).
"" "To 'intend' must be understood to mean the same with 'design' or 'con-
template.'" State v. McDonald, 4 Port. 449, 455 (Ala. 1837).
433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 642.
40403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961).
47 Id. at 579, 170 A.2d at 313.
'8 See p. 345 & note 7 supra.
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Sterno container itself and was as plain to him as it was to the defendant.
If the deceased was thus aware of the danger, his independent act, as
the one in Root, could insulate the defendant from criminal liability.
The court concluded that Root may be distinguished by the fact that the
intervening act in Feinberg was what the defendant had contemplated.
Although the defendant in Root had expected his competitor to try to pass,
he probably had not expected that the attempt would be performed in a
negligent manner. However, this distinction is not persuasive since the
two had engaged in a high-speed race in which any attempt to pass
might be negligent. The intervening act of the attempt to pass was there-
fore just as foreseeable or contemplated as that of drinking Sterno. Root
easily could have been controlling on the facts of Feinberg.
The result in Atencio was based not only on conspiracy but also on
criminal negligence in "helping to bring about the deceased's foolish act."49
The defendant in Feinberg by selling the lethal Sterno to those whom he
knew or should have known would drink it likewise helped to bring about
a foolish act even though he was not present when the Sterno was con-
sumed.
The decision in Feinberg could have been controlled by or distinguished
from any one of the above three decisions because it contains both the
elements on which each of the cases was based and additional elements
by which to distinguish them. What is clear is that Feinberg involved
a factual situation filled with culpability. In order to increase his already
substantial sales of Sterno to alcoholics, the defendant had purchased in-
dustrial Sterno in order to receive a larger quantity. During the time
that he had industrial Sterno available for sale, thirty-one persons in the
skid-row district of Philadelphia died from methanol poisoning.50 In
holding criminal liability on these facts, the court expanded the tort con-
cept of legal duty into the area of criminal law. It also considered the
difficult causation problem that will always be raised by imposition of that
duty. After Feinberg, a merchant might be convicted of arson for selling
gasoline in the face of a threat of riot on the theory that he knew or should
have known that purchasers intended to make fire bombs. A druggist
might be convicted for selling one of many types of common remedies if
he suspected that it might be improperly imbibed or injected. Although
it is not completely clear in which cases this legal duty is to be imposed,
"' 345 Mass, at 629, 189 N.E.2d at 225. See p. 349 supra.
50 433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 638. The defendant was convicted on five counts
for those deaths.
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ground is broken for its extension to any merchant who reasonably should
know the use for which his products are intended.
RICHARD L. GRIER
Criminal Procedure-Requirements for Acceptance of Guilty Pleas
A recent study estimates that in some jurisdictions as many as ninety
per cent of all criminal convictions are obtained through guilty pleas.,
The Supreme Court has set forth explicit standards that must be followed
by both state and federal judges before a guilty plea can be accepted. The
holding in McCarthy v. United States' binds federal trial judges to the
requirements of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. And
if the dissent in Boykin v. Alabaa 3 is correct, the majority opinion in
that case compels state courts to follow the basic requirements of rule 11.
The rule provides:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of
the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, and shall not accept such a plea or a plea of nolo contendere
without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that
the plea is made voluntarily and with understanding of the nature of
the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to
plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant
corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is
satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea (as amended effec-
tive July 1, 1966).
In McCarthy the defendant was prosecuted for tax evasion in a fed-
eral district court in Illinois and entered a plea of guilty to one of three
counts. The court accepted this plea after McCarthy's counsel stated that
he had advised the defendant of the consequences of the plea. The de-
fendant expressed his desire to plead guilty and acknowledged his under-
standing of the consequences of such a plea with respect to the waiver of
jury trial and the punishment involved. At the insistence of the pros-
ecutor, the defendant further stated that the plea had not been induced by
threats or promises.4 McCarthy was convicted and appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the ground that his guilty plea
'PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 134 (1967).
289 S. Ct. 1166 (1969).
S89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969).
'United States v. McCarthy, 387 F.2d 838, 840 (7th Cir. 1968).
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